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We think of investigation as a road to truth, and truth as the goal of
an investigation. Yet time and again, high-visibility investigations of
public scandals not only fail to uncover the truth, they seem to redirect
the focus in the wrong direction. The Department of Defense's ("DoD")
investigations of the detainee abuse scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison are
a recent example of this. With the departure of the Bush Administration,
there is renewed interest in examining both the Abu Ghraib scandal and
other aspects of the administration's interrogation policies. Senator
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Patrick Leahy, the Senate Judiciary Committee chairman, has proposed a
truth commission on the lines of the South Africa Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.1 Others have called for Congressional
4
3
hearings, 2 criminal investigations, and even war crimes prosecutions.
A USA Today/Gallup poll showed that Americans favored an
investigation into the possible use of torture during the Bush
administration by an almost two-to-one margin.5
As we debate what investigations to undertake, we should look
closely at the investigations that have already been completed. DoD
conducted fourteen separate investigations of detainee abuse at the Abu
Ghraib prison and other locations, 6 expending a tremendous amount of
time, money, and personnel. Unfortunately, these investigations did not
answer the most fundamental questions about who directed or ordered
the use of abusive tactics on detainees, and the reports' findings were the
subject of widespread criticism by the news media, congressional
leaders, and human rights groups.
The failures of these investigations are not unique. Internal
corporate investigations of wrongdoing at companies such as Enron,
Apple, Oracle, and UnitedHealth have all been criticized for their
inadequacies.7 Investigations of law enforcement scandals, such as the
Rampart scandal by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), have

1. See Kate Phillips, JudiciaryChairman Calls for Commission to Delve into Bush
Practices, The Caucus Blog, N.Y. TIMES, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/
09/judiciary-chairman-calls-for-commission-to-delve-into-bush-practices/ (Feb. 9, 2009,
17:30 EST).
2. See Joseph Williams, Some Call For Bush Administration Trials, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 3, 2009, at A13, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
washington/articles/2009/02/03/somecallfor bushadministrationtrials/.
3. See John Conyers, Jr., Why We Have To Look Back, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2009,
at A19.
4. See Scott Horton, Justice After Bush: Prosecuting an Outlaw Administration,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, December 2008, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2008/12/0082303.
5. See Jill Taylor, Poll: Most want inquiry into anti-terror tactics, USA TODAY,
Feb. 12, 2009, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-0211-investigation-poll N.htm.
6. A listing of these reports can be found at DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE, REVIEW OF DoD-DIRECTED INVESTIGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE 32
(2006) [hereinafter YOUNG REPORT], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/
abuse.pdf. There were also individual criminal investigations conducted by the Army's
Criminal Investigation Division, some of which resulted in courts martial or other
discipline by the Army. These investigations were generally not released publicly, and

are not the subject of this article.
7. See Edward Iwata, When Companies Investigate Themselves: Too Easy?, USA
TODAY, May 1, 2007, at IB, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/
management/2007-05-01-corp-investigations-usatN.htm.
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been criticized by outside observers as minimizing the scope and nature
of the problems.8
For outside observers and the public, determining whether an
investigation is legitimate poses a considerable challenge. These public
investigations usually have all the outward appearances of legitimacy,
having been conducted by experienced investigators or lawyers who
interviewed numerous witnesses, reviewed mountains of documents, and
issued extensive reports.
It is also difficult to evaluate these investigations because of a lack
of recognized standards for what an investigation should be. While there
is often considerable public comment about an individual public
investigation, little literature or scholarship has looked at these
investigations in a global manner, discussing how they should be
structured or what protocols they should follow. There is some writing
in the related area of corporate internal investigations, an area of the law
that is expanding with the onset of Sarbanes-Oxley and other government
regulation. 9 Some scholarship, prompted largely by DNA exonerations
of the wrongfully convicted, has studied flaws in criminal
investigations.'° There is also relevant scholarly writing about the theory
and standards for historical research.11 However, none of this writing
provides sufficient guidance for the larger problems posed by public
investigations.
This article examines the DoD investigations of the Abu Ghraib
scandal in an effort to provide a methodology for the identification of
flawed public investigations and an analysis of how and why these
investigations failed to reach the truth of the matter. It then proposes a
protocol to be used when evaluating other public investigations by
governments or corporations, and proposes guidelines on how to
structure more public investigations in the future.
8. The Rampart scandal involved allegations of systematic police perjury at the
Rampart Division of the LAPD which eventually led to the exoneration of at least 100
defendants, beginning in September 1999. See Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent
Analysis ofthe Los Angeles Police Department'sBoard ofInquiry Report on the Rampart
Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 545 (2001). A revised version of this article is available at
http://llr.lls.edu/volumes/v34-issue2/chemerinsky.pdf (revised Sept. 21, 2005).
9. See generally Hon. Dick Thornburgh, Organizing a Successful Corporate
Internal Investigation, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 21, 2006, at 1; David M. Brodsky,
Strategiesfor Conducting InternalInvestigations, 1418 PLI/CORP 941, 943 (2004); John
R. Brantley & William S. Anderson, A Director's Guide to Conducting Effective Internal
Investigations,23 CORP. COUNS. REV. 233 (2004).
10. D. KIM RossMo, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION FAILURES 133-34 (2008); Samuel R.
Gross & Barbara O'Brien, Frequencyand PredictorsofFalse Conviction: Why We Know
So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, Soc. Sci. RES. NETWORK, Sept. 2007,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=996629.
11.

RICHARD J. EVANS, IN DEFENSE OF HISTORY 94-95 (2000).
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The DoD reports provide an ideal case study to observe an
investigation in action. The large number of different reports and the
volume of material allow us to look beneath the surface of an
investigation in a manner rarely available in other public scandals. This
article first examines the reports' widely criticized findings regarding
command responsibility for the abuse; findings that focused attention
away from senior DoD officials, the CIA, and the White House. It then
addresses the question of how, given the vast resources devoted to the
investigations, the resulting findings were flawed.
The basic criteria for assessing these investigations reflect a review
of the relevant literature and this author's own experience conducting
investigations for public agencies and attorneys involved in public
controversies. The criteria include:
*
*

*

*
*
*
*

determining the proper scope of the investigation;
the choice of investigators with appropriate independence,
the right balance of staff, and the use of subject matter
experts;
the selection of witnesses who are relevant to the scope of
investigation, and who give a balance of evidence from their
different perspectives;
identifying and addressing the barriers to witness disclosure;
the appropriate use of documentary evidence such as prior
investigative reports;
pursuing relevant leads up the chain of command; and
intellectual integrity in the report's analysis of evidence.

The DoD investigations were significantly flawed.
The
investigators were not independent of DoD, and utilized no subject
matter experts from outside the military. 12 The reports failed to pursue
obvious leads up the chain of command, even though the stated scope of
the investigations clearly called for this. 13 There was an almost singleminded reliance upon interviews with officers and soldiers, with little
analysis about the barriers for disclosure faced by these witnesses, or any
discussion of evidence from non-military witnesses. 14 Many of the
fourteen investigations relied uncritically upon the work of the earlier
investigations, producing a series of reports that were often selfreferential, providing little or no new information as each successive

12.
13.
14.

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part III.F.
See discussion infra Part III.C-D.
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report was issued.1 5 In addition, the reports contained clear analytical
errors with unsupported conclusions, mischaracterizations 16of the
evidence, inconsistent logic, and the use of misleading language.
The lessons learned from the mistakes in the Abu Ghraib
investigations can be applied to a wide range of public investigations,
whether they involve high-profile military or law enforcement
controversies, corporate scandals, or issues of smaller scale wrong-doing
in state and local governments.
The miscues in the Abu Ghraib
investigations can help us identify the warning signs, as well as the
protocols and principles that can be used to structure future
investigations. This knowledge is of importance today as the question of
further investigations into the issue of torture is publicly debated, as well
as for any future investigations of public controversy by a government or
corporation.
I.

OVERVIEW OF DOD INVESTIGATIONS

The Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad had a notorious reputation as
Saddam Hussein's torture chamber before U.S. forces invaded in March
2003.17 After the fall of the Hussein regime, the U.S. Army took control
of the prison and reopened it for use in August 2003.18 Initially used as a
facility for criminals, when the insurgency intensified in the fall of 2003,
U.S. forces began using the prison to detain those captured during
combat operations.1 9 During the ensuing months, the number of
detainees in the prison rose dramatically from 1,000 to 2,000 in October
2003, to over 5,000 in November 2003, and over 7,000 by February
2004.20

In August 2003, Major General Geoffrey Miller, who had
commanded the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, was sent to
Abu Ghraib to review detainee operations, specifically the interrogation
procedures. 21 It was Miller who reportedly directed that interrogation

15.
16.
17.

See discussion infra Part III.E.
See discussion infra Part III.F-G.
See
Chronology of Abu
Ghraib,

WASH.

POST,

May

9,

2004,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/daily/graphics/abughraib_050904.htm.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Abuse at Abu Ghraib, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/nation/daily/graphics/prison_082604.html;
Mark Follman & Tracy
Clark-Flory, The Abu Ghraib Files: Investigations and Other Resources,SALON.COM,

Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.salon.com/news/abu-ghraib/2006/03/14/investigationsresources/index.html.
21.

See ChronologyofAbu Ghraib,supra note 19.
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practices from Guantanamo be used at Abu Ghraib.22 Brigadier General

Janis Karpinski, who commanded the 800th Military Police Brigade at
the prison, said that Miller's plan was to "Gitmo-ize" the Iraqi prison.23
Before the allegations of the detainee abuse became public, Major
General Ryder, the Army Provost Marshall, conducted the review of
detainee operations in Iraq in October and November 2003.24 Ryder's
report concluded that conditions in the U.S. detention facilities met the
standards set by the Geneva Conventions.2 5
During October and November 2003, a number of detainees at the
Abu Ghraib Prison were tortured and abused by U.S. military
personnel.2 6 In November 2003, Army Specialist Joseph M. Darby
received a computer file with hundreds of images of detainee abuse from
Army Corporal Charles A. Graner. Darby gave the file to the Army's
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) on January 13, 2004.27 CID
initiated an internal criminal investigation at the prison by interviewing a
number of military personnel and thirteen detainees. 28 Following these
interviews, the Army appointed Major General Antonio Taguba to
conduct an investigation into the abuse allegations, and the role of the
Army's Military Police, who provided security at the prison, as well as
into other issues regarding the prison's management. 29 The Taguba
investigative report (the "Taguba Report") was completed on March 3,
2004, and six soldiers were charged criminally as a result on March 20,
2004.
On February 10, 2004, the Acting Secretary of the Army directed
the Army's Inspector General, Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, to
conduct a review of all the Army's detainee operations in Iraq and

22. See John Barry, Mark Hosenball & Babak Dehghanpisheh, Abu Ghraib and
Beyond, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 2004, http://www.newsweek.com/id/105304.
23. Id.
24. See MAJ. GEN. DONALD RYDER, REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
OPERATIONS

IN

IRAQ

(2003)

[hereinafter

RYDER

REPORT],

available

at

http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Ryder/ 20Report.pdf.
25. See id. at 7.
26.

See Seymour M. Hersh, Annals of National Security: Torture at Abu Ghraib,

NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/l0/0405I0fa_
fact.
27. See id.
28. See Washingtonpost.com, Sworn Statements by Abu Ghraib Detainees, available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/iraq/abughraib/swomstatements
042104.html [hereinafter Sworn Statements] (last visited Feb. 12, 2009);
MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE
15 (2004)
[hereinafter TAGUBA
REPORT],
available at

http://www.npr.org/iraq/ 2004/prison abuse report.pdf.
29.

TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
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Afghanistan. 30 This report (the "Mikolashek Report") was completed on
July 21, 2004. 31
In April 2004, CBS News producers had obtained the photographs
but delayed broadcasting the story for two weeks at the request of the
DoD.32 Following CBS's contact with DoD, the Army appointed Army
Major General George R. Fay on April 15, 2004, to investigate the
activities of military intelligence personnel in the burgeoning scandal.33
Eventually, Lieutenant General Anthony Jones was appointed to head the
investigation so he could interview officers and assess the conduct of
officers who outranked Major General Fay.34 This investigation (the
"Fay/Jones Report") was completed on August 23, 2004. 35
On April 28, 2004, the public learned of the prison abuse
investigations through the release of some of the photos on the CBS
program 60 Minutes IA, 3 6 and through an article by Seymour Hersch in
The New Yorker magazine, which was published at about the same time
the CBS program was aired.37 On May 12, 2004, in response to the
growing public controversy, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
appointed what was described as an independent investigation panel
composed of former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and
Harold Brown, retired Air Force General Charles Homer, and former
Congresswoman Tillie K. Fowler, a Republican who had served on the
House Armed Services Committee.38 The investigation was headed by
former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. 39 The panel issued its
report (the "Schlesinger Report") on August 24, 2004.40
The Abu Ghraib detainee abuse scandal became one of the most
investigated government scandals since Watergate. Including the reports
noted above, fourteen investigations were initiated by the Army and DoD
30.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY INSPECTOR GEN., INSPECTION REPORT ON DETAINEE

OPERATIONS, at Foreword (2004) [hereinafter MIKOLASHEK REPORT].
31. Id.
32. See Rebecca Leung, Abuse Of Iraqi POWs By GIs Probed, CBS NEWS, Apr. 28,

2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60I1I/main614063.shtml.
33. See MAJ. GEN. GEORGE R. FAY & LT. GEN. ANTHONY R. JONES, AR 15-6
INVESTIGATION OF THE ABu GHRAIB PRISON AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE

10 (2004) [hereinafter FAY/JONES REPORT], available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Leung, supra note 32.
37. See Hersh, supra note 26.
38. See JAMES R. SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO
REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS, app. B (2004) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER

REPORT],
available at
d20040824finalreport.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Id.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/
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into the underlying causes of the scandal. 4 1 These were conducted by
teams of investigators headed by Army and DoD personnel from the rank
of Major General up to former Secretaries of Defense. More than 1,700
witnesses were interviewed, and more than 15,000 pages of documents
were assembled and reviewed.42 Lengthy reports were produced, with
over 2,000 pages of findings, interviews, recommendations, and
appendices. The findings dealt with issues ranging from the brutal
conduct of specific soldiers to the lack of morale-boosting facilities for
personnel at the prison.
The primary focus of this article is on the four reports that garnered
the most national attention: the Taguba Report,4 3 the Fay/Jones Report, a
the Mikolashek Report,45 and the Schlesinger Report.46 The Taguba and

Fay/Jones Reports were significant because they were the most
immediate inquiries conducted, and their findings became the basis for
many of the later investigations. The Mikolashek Report represented the
Department of the Army's institutional response to the controversy, as it
Finally, the
was conducted by the Army's Inspector General.
Schlesinger Report was the most high-ranking effort by DoD, utilizing
former Defense Secretaries.
II.

DISPUTED

FINDINGS

The DoD reports generally acknowledged that some unacceptable
abuses of detainees occurred at the Abu Ghraib prison in the fall of
2003. 4 ' However, the reports' findings about the causes of the abuse and
the ultimate responsibility for it were controversial and disputed by many
observers in the government, the military, and the news media as this
section will demonstrate.
The most high-ranking investigation was conducted by the
Schlesinger Panel. In this report, "[t]he Panel [found] no evidence that
organizations above the 800th MP Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade-level
were directly involved in the incidents at Abu Ghraib. '4 8 The Fay/Jones
Report, led by Major General George Fay of Army Military Intelligence
(MI), concluded that "[t]he chain of command above the 205th MI
Brigade was not directly involved in the abuses at Abu Ghraib. '49
41.
42.

See YOUNG REPORT, supra note 6.
Josh White, Top Army Officers Are Cleared in Abuse Cases, WASH. POST, Apr.

23, 2005, at AO1 (quoting Army spokesman Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks).
TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28.
FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33.
MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30.
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38.

43.
44.
45.
46.

See
See
See
See

47.
48.
49.

See, e.g., YOUNG REPORT, supra note 6, at ii.
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38.
See FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1

Similarly, the Army's Inspector General unequivocally concluded as
follows: "The abuses that have occurred are not representative of
[Army] policy, doctrine or Soldier training. These abuses should be
viewed as what they are-unauthorized actions taken by a few
individuals.... These actions, while regrettable, are aberrations.... 5 0
Many outside the military did not accept these findings, and even
some within the military expressed skepticism. One of the Army's own
investigators, Major General Taguba, a thirty-year career officer, stated,
"From what I knew, troops just don't take it upon themselves to initiate
what they did without any form of knowledge of the higher-ups." 51 Rear
Admiral John D. Hutson (ret.), who served as the Navy's Judge
Advocate General from 1997 to 2000, stated, "The [DoD]
investigations.., failed to address senior military and civilian command
responsibility and in doing so separate culpability 52from responsibility.
This is antithetical to the way the military operates.,
The skepticism was bipartisan. Senate Armed Services Committee
member Lindsay Graham, a conservative Republican, stated, "This is not
a few bad apples. This is a system failure, a massive failure. 53
Congressman David Obey, the ranking Democrat on the House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee, observed, "This [abuse] could not have
happened without people in the upper echelon of the Administration
54
giving signals. I just didn't see how this was not systemic.
A bipartisan report by Senate Armed Services Committee released
in December 2008 contradicted the DoD report findings, concluding as
follows:
The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to
the actions of "a few bad apples" acting on their own. The fact is that
senior officials in the United States government solicited information
on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the
appearance55 of their legality, and authorized their use against
detainees.

50.

51.

See MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30.
See Hersh, supra note 26.

52. Jim Lobe, Retired Brass Call for Independent Torture Probe, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Sept. 8, 2004, http://ipsnews.net/intema.asp?idnews=25402.
53. See Barry et al., supra note 22.
54. See Hersh, supra note 26.
55.

SENATE ARMED SERVICES

COMMITTEE

INQUIRY

INTO THE TREATMENT

OF

DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xii (2008), available at http://Ievin.senate.gov/newsroom/
supporting/2008/Detainees. 121108.pdf [hereinafter SENATE INQUIRY].
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Others have questioned the DoD findings. As a New York Times
editorial stated:
Most Americans have long known that the horrors of Abu
Ghraib were not the work of a few low-ranking sociopaths. All but
President Bush's most unquestioning supporters recognized the chain
of unprincipled decisions that led to the abuse, torture and death
in prisons run by the American military and intelligence services.56
For many observers, the DoD investigations failed to resolve the
most important questions about the scandal. Senate Armed Services
Committee Chair Carl Levin stated it directly, "Department of Defense
investigations into detainee abuse failed to adequately assign
accountability to those senior military and civilian officials who
authorized abusive interrogation techniques. 57 As one book about the
scandal put it, "The stream of [DoD] reports ... according to legal
experts, did more to obfuscate the58subject of detainee abuse than to shed
light on the events at that prison.,

III. INVESTIGATIVE STEPS
Investigations typically move through a series of steps. At the
outset, those who have ordered the investigation must determine the
scope or breadth of the inquiry. 59 Next, the investigator or investigative
team must be selected.6 ° Once the investigation is underway, decisions
are made about who should be interviewed and what documents should
be reviewed. 61
Finally, based on an analysis of the evidence,
investigators draw conclusions about what occurred.6 2 Investigative
flaws can occur at any stage, resulting in disputed findings that may fall
short of the investigation's initial goal or lack credibility. To understand
how the DoD investigations failed, we need to look at each investigative
step, evaluating and analyzing the process closely.

56.

Editorial,

The

Torture

Report,

N.Y.

TIMES,

Dec.

18,

2008,

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/opinion/18thul .html.
57. Press Release, Office of Senator Carl Levin, Levin, McCain Release Executive
Summary & Conclusions of Report on Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (Dec. 11,
2008), availableat http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=305735.
58. TARA MCKELVEY, MONSTERING: INSIDE AMERICA'S POLICY OF SECRET
INTERROGATIONS AND TORTURE IN THE TERROR WAR 177 (2007).
59. See Thornburgh, supra note 9; Ralph C. Ferrara, Ann M. Ashton & Jonathan R.

Tuttle,
Co, 65
60.
61.
62.

Internal CorporateInvestigations and the SEC's Message to Directors in Cooper
U. CiN. L. REV. 75 (1996).
See sources cited supra note 59.
See id.
See id.
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Scope of Investigations: How Farto Go?

The first step in any investigation is the determination of its goal or
scope.6 3 The scope of an investigation determines what subjects will be
covered and which questions will be answered. 64 It also determines who
will lead the investigation and decide its findings.65 It guides everything
from the use of resources, to the specific questions asked of witnesses, to
the subject matter of the final reports.66 The scope defines the playing
field upon which the entire investigation unfolds.67
As the investigation's scope is generally set by the establishing
agency, the scope informs the public of the inquiry's goal and can seek to
have a public relations impact long before any findings result. 68 Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld announced the formation of the Schlesinger Panel
when he faced calls for his resignation over the scandal during
contentious hearings in front of Senate Armed Services Committee,6 9
stating, "I'm confident that these distinguished individuals
will provide a
70
full and fair assessment of what has been done thus far.'
The Schlesinger Panel and several of the DoD investigations were
given the broadest of ostensible scopes. In his letter appointing the
Schlesinger Panel, Rumsfeld asked for their "views on the causes of the
problems and what should be done to fix them.", 7' The Army's Inspector
General Mikolashek was directed to prepare "a comprehensive review of
72
how the Army conducts detainee operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.,
General Jones's investigation was "specifically directed to focus on
whether organizations or personnel higher than the 2 0 5 th MI Brigade
chain of command, or events and circumstances outside the 2 0 5 th MI
Brigade were involved directly or indirectly in the questionable
activities
73
regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.,
The Taguba Report's scope was significantly more limited and is an
example of how an organization can use a more limited scope of
investigation to control a report's outcome. The Taguba Report was
63. See Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 1; Brodsky, supra note 9, at 3.
64. As an investigator, the author draws from his knowledge and experience in
setting the scopes of investigations to elaborate on and explain the importance of this
step.
65. See supra note 64.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Philip Shenon, Prison-Abuse Panel is Third In Bush's War on Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at A8.
70. Id.
71. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 106.
72. See MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30, at 2.
73. See FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at 2.
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initiated before the widespread publication of the Abu Ghraib photos,
and General Taguba was ordered to focus on the lowest possible level:
the role of the Military Police units. The report strongly condemned the
conduct of the MPs, but Taguba also came to believe there was higherlevel involvement in the abuse that he could not investigate. As Taguba
told The New Yorker after he left the military, "I suspected that
somebody was giving them [the MPs] guidance, but I could not print
that.... Somebody was giving them guidance, but I was legally
prevented from further investigation into higher authority. I was limited
to a box.

74

The Schlesinger, Mikolashek, and Fay/Jones Reports had
appropriately broad scopes of investigation, but as will be discussed
below these inquiries did not execute investigations consistent with their
assigned scopes.75
Investigators given the broadest mandates have the greatest
responsibility in a situation like the Abu Ghraib scandal. The stated
scope of an investigation provides a benchmark to which the
investigation's authors can be held accountable. In the Abu Ghraib case,
the investigations with the broadest scopes were later widely cited by
DoD and Bush administration officials as evidence that the causes of the
scandal were narrowly contained.
B.

Selecting the Investigators

The term "investigator" herein indicates the entire investigative
team, including both the leaders of an investigation and the line
investigators. For an investigation with a broad scope to be credible, its
investigators must be willing and able to follow the evidence wherever it
leads. They cannot be restricted by concern for their professional
advancement, or by pre-existing biases or attitudes. 76 This is hard to
achieve in any investigation, but is even more essential in the military
where the chain of command is the key fact of life for military personnel.

74. See Hersh, supra note 26.
75. Another aspect of the abuse was the role of two defense contractors who helped
run the prison: CACI provided interrogators, and Titan/L-3 provided translators. There is
significant evidence that these contractors played a role in the abuse of the detainees, an
issue which the DoD reports generally did not investigate. In fact, as of this writing,
there has been no systemic DoD investigation of the role of the contractors in the abuse.
This article does not address the role of contractors in the abuse of detainees at Abu
Ghraib because of this author's on-going involvement in the litigation between former
detainees and these two firms. The article draws only from public source documents, and
does not utilize materials from that litigation.
76. See Ferrara et al., supra note 59, at 84; Brodsky, supra note 9, at 1; Brantley &
Anderson, supra note 9, at 2.
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Expecting members in the military chain of command to conduct a
credible investigation of those above them is unrealistic, a fact that the
Army's standard investigative protocols recognize. Army regulations do
not permit a junior officer to interview or investigate a more senior
officer.77
This situation led to the replacement of Major General Fay as the
initial lead investigator of MI at Abu Ghraib. Fay, a two-star general,
was appointed by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, a three-star
general. However, when it became clear that the investigation could
potentially implicate Sanchez as a link in the chain of command above
the prison, Sanchez recused himself.78 A four-star general, General Paul
Kern, then appointed Lieutenant General Jones to head the investigation.
Jones was a more senior officer than Sanchez, so he could interview and
investigate Sanchez.
With the exception of the Schlesinger Panel, virtually all of the lead
DoD investigators were active-duty military officers.79 Some of these
officers, like Department of the Army Inspector General Mikolashek,
had specific oversight duties, but others were line-officers drafted from
other assignments to conduct the investigations.80
Several of the investigations conducted by active-duty military
officers like Mikoslashek and Fay/Jones had broad scopes; however,
there is an inherent conflict of interest for military officers conducting an
investigation that could implicate their superiors both at DoD and the
White House. The use of these military officers as lead investigators
raises questions about the seriousness of the stated scopes of these
investigations. The Army's investigative protocols meant that the
appointment of a Lieutenant General (Anthony Jones) was a direct
statement that his investigation would go no higher on the chain of
command than another Lieutenant General, Ricardo Sanchez,
irrespective of the broad language of its scope.
77. See General in Iraq Abuse Probe Seeks Removal, USA TODAY, June 10, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-06-10-prison-probex.htm.
78. See News Transcript, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs), Special Defense Department Briefing on Results of Investigation of Military
Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib Prison Facility (Aug. 25, 2004) available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2698.
79. The one exception was Shelton Young, the Deputy Inspector General for
Intelligence, a career employee of the Department of Defense. Young authored the
Review of DoD-DirectedInvestigationsof DetaineeAbuse (the Young Report), issued on
Aug. 25, 2006. For further discussion of the Young Report, see infra Part III.E (Use of
Prior Reports).
80. Taguba had been the Deputy Commanding General for Support, Third Army,
U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Coalition Forces Land Component Command
(CFLCC), based in Kuwait. Jones was the Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command. Fay was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
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These conflicts of interest were not academic questions for
investigators. Major General Antonio Taguba issued a report that was
critical of the Army. 8'

In January 2006, after an otherwise spotless

military career of thirty years, Taguba was directed to retire by the
Army's Vice-Chief of Staff, an action Taguba attributed directly to his
blunt investigation. s2 Taguba stated, "They always shoot the messenger.
To be accused of being overzealous and disloyal-that cuts deep into me.
I was being ostracized for doing what I was asked to do."83
One DoD investigation that did not use active duty officers as the
lead investigators was the Schlesinger Panel. However, while none of
the Panel members were employed by DoD at the time, all had
previously been influential members of the armed forces management
structure.84 All had previous responsibilities for overseeing the very
military systems that were now in question.85 They were technically
"independent," but their collective histories with DoD raised significant
questions about their functional independence.
Following the release of the DoD reports, a group of eight retired
generals and admirals wrote to President Bush calling for the
appointment of a bipartisan, independent commission into U.S. detention
and interrogation practices, stating the following:
Investigations that are purely internal to the military, however
competent, cannot examine the whole picture....
Internal
investigations, by their nature, also suffer from a critical
lack of
independence. Americans have never thought it wise or fair for one
branch of government to police itself. But86that has been exactly the
case in many of the abuse inquiries to date.
Another issue for the DoD investigations was their failure to utilize
outside subject matter experts, either as part of their investigative teams,
as consulting experts, or to utilize non-DoD investigators from other U.S.
government agencies. 87 Outside subject matter experts were readily
available through organizations like the International Criminal Court
(ICC) at the Hague, the various War Crimes Tribunals, as well as human
rights groups. Numerous U.S. judges, former criminal prosecutors, and

81.

See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28.

82. See Hersh, supra note 26.
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying note 38.
85. See id.
86. Press Release, Retired Generals, Admirals Call for Independent Probe into
Torture; Human Rights First Report Shows Gaps in Investigations So Far (Sept. 8, 2004)
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2004_alerts/0907.htm.
87. See Brantley & Anderson, supra note 9, at 2; Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 2.
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law enforcement officials have gained experience in investigating
88
potential human rights abuses for the ICC and related entities.
There were good reasons to utilize some active duty military
personnel in these investigations. A command structure like the Army's
requires ranking officers to be involved in the investigation in order to
compel the cooperation of lower ranking soldiers by direct order. Also,
this author's own experience conducting investigations in military and
law enforcement structures highlights the importance of having some
team members who are familiar with an organization's unique culture,
structure, rules, and policies.
Investigators who have shared
backgrounds with witnesses, and speak the language of the organization,
can make some organization witnesses more comfortable about speaking
openly.
To be consistent with the stated scopes of the investigations,
investigators should have been both functionally and personally
independent of the chain of command. 89 The teams should have utilized
outside subject matter experts working alongside military personnel
familiar with the Army's structure and culture.
The type of investigator directly impacts what evidence becomes
available. Witnesses may be more or less willing to speak openly about
their experiences, based on their perceptions of who the investigators are.
In this author's experience, witnesses do a remarkably rapid calculation
about how safe it is to come forward with controversial revelations. If
the investigators are perceived as independent of an organization's
culture, and as neutral and unbiased, witnesses who were on the fence
about speaking candidly will be more willing to speak out. On the other
hand, using investigators who are too closely associated with the subject
organization can have an insidious self-limiting effect. Some witnesses
will quickly decide that the interview is not a safe venue in which to
speak candidly.
Other problems flowed from the choice of investigators. Any
investigator makes dozens of judgment calls, and their attitudes and
views impact each of these decisions. Many of these decisions are
analyzed below, and include the selection of witnesses and other
evidence, how the investigators dealt with the barriers to disclosure by
88. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Californiansat The Hague, CAL. LAWYER, Dec. 2006, at
27-28. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
included Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the first black woman appointed to the federal court
in Texas, and Patricia M. Wald of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See id.
at 27. Lawyers at the Tribunal included former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of
California, Terree A. Bowers, as well other former DOJ prosecutors. See id. at 28.
89. See Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 1. "Investigators involved in these types of
undertakings [internal corporate investigations] must, of course, be totally independent of
the organizations that engaging them." Id.
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witnesses, the quality and type of analysis conducted, and finally, the
findings and recommendations.
Independence is a matter of context and appearances as well. The
Abu Ghraib scandal played out internationally. The bad publicity had an
increasingly negative impact on the reputation of the U.S. military
around the world, and on the war effort in Iraq. 90 An investigation by a
truly independent panel would have garnered far greater respect from the
international community, and the findings would have been more widely
accepted.
C.

Choice of Witnesses

With the scope of the inquiry delineated and the investigators
chosen, the process turns to the collection of evidence.
Any
investigation is a series of choices. With an event like the Abu Ghraib
scandal, the universe of potential evidence is so large that it is unrealistic
to interview every potential witness or review every document. The
choice of witnesses obviously influences the type of evidence collected,
but also reveals something about the investigative team's values, and
influences its views on the case as a whole.
The DoD investigations focused overwhelmingly, and in some cases
exclusively, on interviews with current military personnel. 9
The
Mikolashek Report interviewed and surveyed over 650 soldiers from the
ranks of Private to Major General at twenty-six different locations in
Iraq, Afghanistan and the United States. They interviewed no nonmilitary witnesses.9 2 Generals Fay and Jones, with an investigative team
of twenty-six personnel, conducted over 170 interviews, all but three of
which were with soldiers and officers.9 3 As will be discussed below, the
Schlesinger Report's list of witnesses included some civilian leaders in
the Pentagon, but was otherwise largely limited to soldiers and officers.94
Given the broad scope of the Mikolashek, Schlesinger, and
Fay/Jones investigations, interviewing those higher up on the chain of
command with authority to direct the activities of detainee detention and
90. Former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora reported that some high-ranking
military officers "maintain that the first and second identifiable causes of U.S. combat
deaths in Iraq-as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into
combat-are, respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo." Press Release,
supra note 57.
91. A key exception is the Taguba Report. See infra text accompanying note 104.
92. See MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30, at 2.
93. See FAY/JONEs REPORT, supra note 33, at 3.
94. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 23-25. The Schlesinger Panel did
have some contact with the ICRC and the Human Rights Executive Directors'
Coordinating Group, but the report did not discuss any evidence provided by either
group. Id. at 23-25, 85-87.
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interrogation would seem natural. This did not occur even though, as
will be discussed below, Fay/Jones and Schlesinger uncovered leads that
clearly pointed to these potential witnesses. None of the investigations
included interviews of anyone in the White House or in the CIA.
Mikolashek's report interviewed Privates and even Army chaplains,
but went no higher than a group he described as "selected leaders at the
Combined Forces Land Component Command and the Combined Joint
Task Force, division." 95 Fay/Jones interviewed Lieutenant General
(LTG) Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-7,
but no one higher. The Schlesinger Panel conducted interviews up
through the DoD chain, including Secretary Rumsfeld, but provided no
details about those interviews. The Panel did not report what was asked
of these high-level witnesses or what their responses were, nor did it cite
these interviews as a basis for its conclusions.
Numerous other potential witnesses could have been interviewed.
Several reports noted the presence of employees of Other Government
Agencies (OGA) at the prison, a euphemism generally used for CIA and
other intelligence personnel.96 A senior member of the National Security
Council toured the prison. 97 Iraqi Police were stationed inside Abu
Ghraib.98 Numerous government contractors with the firm CACI, who
served as interrogators, and with the firm Titan, who worked as
translators, were also present at the prison. 99 The International
l00
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also had access to the prison.
Many of the investigations interviewed few or no detainees.
Detainee interviews were a potential source of evidence on many issues,
including the question of higher level involvement in the abuse. While
the detainees were not present at staff meetings where orders regarding
interrogations were given, they could have provided other relevant
information such as the types of questions they were asked during
interrogations, what torture techniques were used during specific time
periods, who was present during interrogations, and what roles they
played. This author interviewed detainees who provided detailed
physical descriptions of their interrogators and of the officers overseeing
the interrogations. Several detainees spoke English and could understand
discussions between the interrogators. All of this evidence could later
have been compared with interviews of soldiers and interrogators, and
95. See MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30, at 6-8.
96. See e.g. YOUNG REPORT, supra note 6, at 14 (discussing the presence of OGA's
operating with military units without "interagency agreements").
97. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 65-66.
98. See id. at 74.
99. See discussion supra note 75.
100. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supranote 38, at 85-88.
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documentary evidence such as emails and policy memos, to track the
evolution of interrogation approaches and potentially assign
responsibility for the approaches being utilized.
Interviews with detainees might have led to a more comprehensive
understanding of the breadth of the detainee abuse problem. Human
rights groups have repeatedly asserted that detainee abuse was a
widespread problem in U.S. detention facilities,1 ' a view that was
rejected in the DoD reports. However, if the DoD investigations had
been conducted differently, their findings might have had a different
emphasis. For instance, the Mikolashek investigation energetically
interviewed hundreds of soldiers all over Iraq and Afghanistan; if the
investigation had interviewed as many detainees in these areas with equal
vigor, we might have an entirely different view of the breadth and scope
of abuse. In any event, with only a relative handful of DoD detainee
interviews to depend upon, we have no effective way of evaluating the
DoD'snarrowly focused findings.
In the first week after the Army obtained the now infamous photos,
the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) interviewed thirteen
detainees. 102 These interviews focused only on individual acts of abuse,
with an eye towards proving direct culpability for specific violations of
Army rules.' 0 3 he goal of the interviews was limited to extracting
evidence that could be used in potential courts martial. There is no
indication that other detainees were interviewed, and the interviews did
not appear to deal with any broader potential issues.
All of the DoD investigations included the CID investigation among
the documents they reviewed, but most disregarded the detainee
interviews in their analysis. The reasons for this are not clear. It could
mean that the CID interviews were inadequate for these later
investigators; but if so, why didn't these other investigators conduct their
own detainee interviews more focused on their own scopes of
investigation? Another possibility is that the later DoD investigators
gave little credence to the detainees because of the investigators'
institutional biases, or their preconceived notions about the value of this
evidence. A final possibility is that these DoD investigators were fearful
that further detainee interviews would reveal additional evidence of
abuse, further complicating their task.
101.

HINA SHAMSI, COMMAND'S RESPONSIBILITY: DETAINEE DEATHS IN U.S. CUSTODY

IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, (Deborah Pearlstein ed., Feb. 2006), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/etn/dic/index.asp; REED BRODY, THE ROAD TO

ABU GHRAIB (Widney Brown, ed., June 8, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/
en/reports/2004/06/08/road-abu-ghraib.
102. See Sworn Statements, supra note 28.
103. See id.
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The Taguba Report was the only DoD report that utilized detainee
evidence in any significant manner. Taguba specifically cited the
detainee evidence in his findings, stating, "I have carefully considered
the statements provided by the following detainees, which under the
circumstances I find credible, based on the clarity of
their statements and
10 4
supporting evidence provided by other witnesses."'
The failure to consider non-military points of view in the DoD
reports led to a blind reliance on the statements by these officers and
soldiers. Mikolashek repeatedly cited his interviews with soldiers and
officers as the only basis for numerous factual findings, but provided no
justification for this. The following example is typical: "Of the
interviewed point of capture battalion and company leaders, 61% (25 of
41) stated their units... held detainees at their locations from 12 hours
up to 30 days."'0 5 The report provided no other evidence relating to this
issue, and appears to be relying completely on the officers' selfreporting.
Mikolashek's "Finding 1" stated, "All interviewed and observed
commanders, leaders, and soldiers treated detainees humanely."10 6 It is
unreasonable, even naive, to expect that military personnel are going to
routinely self-report behavior that violates written norms or regulations,
and that could result in discipline or criminal prosecution. This was even
more the case in the Army during the period following the release of the
Abu Ghraib photographs.
Witness selection can have other, more subtle impacts on an
investigation. This author's experience as a career investigator has
shown him that the perspective gained from different witnesses affects
the investigator's point of view and analysis. When virtually all of the
witnesses are from one group, it cannot help but impact the investigator's
view of the facts. Conducting the Abu Ghraib investigations without
interviewing the victim-the detainees-is akin to doing a rape
investigation in civilian law enforcement without interviewing the rape
victim. Critical investigative insights are lost when this happens.
Most of the DoD reports drew narrow conclusions about the causes
of the abuse. These conclusions were not surprising given the reports'
reliance on mostly military witnesses. By contrast, the Taguba Report
utilized more non-military witnesses, and its conclusions provided the
most specific, unqualified statements regarding the abuse, describing
"numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses"' 10 7

104.
105.
106.
107.

See TAGUBA

REPORT,

supra note 28.

See MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30 at v.

See id. at 10.
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28, at 17.
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conclusions,
Taguba provided these findings as clear, stand-alone10 factual
8
conduct.
the
excusing
language
self-serving
without
Having interviewed only military witnesses, the Mikolashek,
Fay/Jones, and other DoD reports focused first on the challenges faced
by the military, rather than detainee treatment. The first lines of the
Mikolashek Report stated that "the overwhelming majority of our leaders
and soldiers understand the requirements to treat detainees humanely and
are doing so," and only then speaks of the "unauthorized [abusive]
actions taken by a few individuals."' 0 9 Similarly, the Fay/Jones Report
first carefully described the troops' "operational environment" of hostile
forces, under-staffing, and inadequate equipment, before concluding that
the primary cause was misconduct by "a small group of morally corrupt
soldiers and civilians," a lack of discipline, and a failure of leadership.1 10
The types of direct findings found in Taguba's report were buried under
a blizzard of exculpatory language in the other reports.
D.

Barriersto Witness Disclosure

It is not enough for investigators to simply select their witnesses,
show up, and ask questions. The investigator must consider who the
witnesses are, what will motivate them to speak, and what the witnesses'
barriers to disclosure are. 1 '1 This is particularly important in military and
para-military organizations where the witnesses' loyalties to their own
units and comrades may be stronger than12 their obligations to follow
orders and cooperate with an investigation.'
11 3
These loyalties, sometimes referred to as a "code of silence," '
played a role in the Abu Ghraib investigations. The Taguba Report made
specific reference to this, stating that the MI unit "seemed to be operating

108. Taguba did not ignore other contributing or mitigating factors. He discusses the
dangerous external threats, under staffing, inadequate training, shortages of equipment,
detainee overcrowding, and shortage of morale facilities in a separate section. See id. at
36-44.
109. See MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30, at 1.
110. See FAY/JONEs REPORT, supra note 33, at ii-iii.
Ill.

See DAVID

A. BINDER &

PAUL BERGMAN,

FACT INVESTIGATION:

FROM

HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF 221-22 (1984); PAUL J. ZWIER & ANTHONY J. BOCCHINO, FACT
INVESTIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND CASE THEORY

DEVELOPMENT 16-22 (2000).
112. See Robin Abcarian, Who You Gonna Call When the Abuser Wears a Badge?,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at El; Michael Gordon, As Policy Decisions Loom, a Code of

Silence Is Broken, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at 18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/washington/16assess.html; Vincent J. Schodolski,
Panel Urges Civilian Oversightfor LAPD, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2000, at 3.
113. See Richard A. Serrano, Prosecutors Strike out with Tailhook Scandal, L.A.

TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, at A41; Gordon, supra note 112.
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in a conspiracy of silence."'" 4 One MI soldier at the prison, Sergeant
Samuel Provance, reported the following:
When I made clear to my superiors that I was troubled about
what had happened, I was told that the honor of my unit and the
Army depended on either withholding the truth or outright lies....
Everything I saw and observed at Abu Ghraib and in Iraq convinced
me that if I filed a report [about the abuse], I wouldn't be listened to,
that it would be covered up. I thought that the best case [scenario]
was that I would be considered a troublemaker and ostracized,
but
115
that potentially, I might even place my life in danger.
In addition to understanding the code of silence, investigators
should know the legal consequences that witnesses face. Soldiers can be
charged for whatever misconduct they engage in, but also for failing to
report the misdeeds of others, even when they did not participate in that
misconduct. This concern was more than a hypothetical issue for
witnesses in the DoD investigations, even for those who wanted to come
forward. When Sergeant Provance was interviewed by General Fay, Fay
told him, "You should have said something earlier. You could have
busted this thing wide open."' " 6 Fay then said he was going to
recommend administrative action against Provance for his failure to
report the abuse, in spite of the fact that Provance was not implicated in
any of the abuse himself.'17
There were no indications in the DoD reports that the investigators
recognized or acknowledged these barriers to disclosure, or took any
steps to address them. In fact, they sometimes took just the opposite
approach. During the initial CID investigation at the prison soldiers were
called down in groups and directed to fill out generic questionnaires
about whether they had witnessed abuse. Then, the few soldiers who had
answered "yes" to any of the questions were publicly called back for
further questioning. Sergeant Provance recalled:
I got worried when the [unit's] leadership announced to everybody
who was being called back for interviews. I noticed very few others
were called back, which implied they had nothing to say. As a result,

114. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28, app. A.
115. Sgt. Samuel J.Provance, Prepared Statement before the National Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Reform (Feb. 13, 2006),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06214-usls-provance-statment.pdf.
116. See McKelvey, supra note 58, at 178.
117. See id. Provance was later disciplined by the Army for speaking with the media
about his observations at Abu Ghraib. Id. He received a reduction in rank. Id.
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the other soldiers118there felt that I must be in trouble, or was telling on
those who were.

These barriers to disclosure do not mean that every soldier was
lying, or that all the information obtained from these interviews was
worthless. However, the investigative reports should have identified
these issues for the reader and discussed what approaches were taken to
address them. It should also have discussed these issues when analyzing
how much relative weight to give to a witness's evidence.
The DoD investigations did not do this. None of these issues was
discussed in any manner in the reports. The impression was that every
soldier always answered questions fully and honestly, and what they
were saying could be taken at face value. The reports appeared to
assume that all soldiers will tell the truth at all times. 9
The DoD investigations were conducted in an environment with
tremendous barriers to witness disclosure: a military command and
control structure with soldiers and officers facing potential court martial
and against a backdrop of an international scandal. Without making
significant efforts to address these barriers, the resulting process was
Only the most
guaranteed to elicit non-controversial statements.
courageous or foolhardy person would conceivably speak out in this
context.
E.

Use of PriorReports

Documents can be a critical source in an investigation, particularly
when they provide first-hand evidence about the underlying events.
Unfortunately, the documents that many of the DoD investigators relied
upon most heavily were the earlier reports by other DoD investigators.
Arranged like a set of Chinese boxes with each report containing the
prior ones, the reports referenced and, generally uncritically relied upon
their predecessors. The Taguba Report referenced the Miller and Ryder
Reports. 120 The Mikolashek Report referenced the Taguba, Miller, and
Ryder Reports.12 1 Fay/Jones, in turn, referenced Mikolashek, Taguba,
Miller, and Ryder.122 The Schlesinger investigation, which was

118. See Provance,supra note 115.
119. While the Mikolashek Report utilizes this approach most overtly, the same
critique can be applied to all of the investigations that relied so heavily on interviews
with the military.
120. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28, at 6-14.
121. See e.g. MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30, at 2.
122. See e.g. FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at i.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1

completed in an unbelievable
forty-five days, was forced to rely heavily
23
on all the prior reports.
The final link in the chain was literally a "report of reports,"24
prepared by the Army's Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence.1
This was a review of the "13 senior-level ...investigations of detention
and interrogation operations that were initiated as a result of detainee
abuse. The purpose... was to evaluate the reports to1 determine
whether
25
any overarching systemic issues should be addressed."
For the Army and the report authors, this approach had obvious
advantages. As the conclusions of the prior reports were already
acceptable to the organization, the subsequent investigators were on safe
ground. They could praise the work of the prior investigators and base
their new findings upon this earlier work, while not having to conduct
further, potentially problematic inquiries. DoD management was then
able to point to a string of reports that exonerated their upper level
management, without subjecting themselves to fourteen truly separate
investigations.
The problem with this approach is obvious. Whatever flaws existed
in the earlier reports were carried wholesale into the new "findings."
The earlier results were adopted, irrespective of the fact that the prior
investigations were conducted with different goals and scope, and looked
at the events through different prisms. The later investigators had no
way of evaluating the earlier witness interviews, their credibility, and
how much weight to give them. The result was the stringing together of
a series of inadequate, but numerous, prior investigations, and then
preparing an overview of those inadequate investigations, to reach
inadequate conclusions.
This process had a particularly insidious effect on the DoD
investigations because of the linchpin role the Taguba Report served for
many of the reports that followed. The Taguba Report was specific
1 26
about the abuse by MPs, and was widely praised by outside observers.
However, Taguba's investigation was explicitly limited to an
investigation of the MPs, and made no findings regarding the conduct of
Military Intelligence, OGAs, or higher-level officials. Subsequent DoD
investigators then "relied" on the generally respected Taguba Report,

123.

See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 15, 21.

124.
125.

See YOUNG REPORT, supra note 6, at 5.
Id.

126. See McKelvey, supra note 58, at 172 ("The Tabuga Report, is according to legal
experts who have studied the issue of detainees and U.S. Policy, the most thorough
official account of the Abu Ghraib events."); Hersh, supra note 26.
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misleadingly stating that no evidence of upper level27 involvement had
been found by Taguba or other earlier investigations.1
The reliance by some investigators on the problematic Ryder Report
demonstrated other hazards of the uncritical adoption of earlier work
product. Major General Ryder, the Army Provost Marshall, conducted a
review of detainee operations in Iraq in October and November 2003.28
He concluded, "Generally, conditions in existing prisons, detention
security,
facilities and jails meet minimal standards of health, sanitation,
' 29
Conventions."'
Geneva
the
by
established
rights
human
and
This sanguine view of the situation was tragically wrong. The
Taguba Report, completed just four months later, noted that the Ryder
investigation was conducted during the period of the most serious abuses
presumably going on as the Ryder
at Abu Ghraib, and that abuses were
130
Ghraib.
Abu
at
working
was
team
Only the Taguba and Schlesinger Reports raised critiques of the
Ryder Report, 13 1 although they also relied in part on Ryder. There was
no mention of Ryder's critical errors in the Fay/Jones, Mikolashek, or
Young Reports.
F.

Failureto PursueLeads Up the Chain of Command

Even though the investigations were flawed, several of the reports
contained evidence that pointed up the chain of command beyond Abu
Ghraib. The manner in which this important evidence was dealt with
tells us a good deal about the quality and effectiveness of these
investigations.
The Schlesinger Report would seem the most likely to uncover
high-level involvement in the abuse. Its investigation was the closest to
an independent inquiry, as it was not conducted by active-duty military
officers or current DoD staff.132 Their witness list went higher up the
chain of command than any of the other investigations, and included

127. The Schlesinger Panel "concur[red] with the findings of the Taguba and Jones
investigations that serious leadership problems [at the Brigade level] ... allowed the
abuses at Abu Ghraib."

See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 15. Fay/Jones

concluded, "Assessing the materials from both MG Fay and from MG Taguba, I agree
that leadership failure, at the brigade level and below, clearly was a factor in not sooner
discovering and taking actions to prevent" the abuse-related incidents. FAY/JONES
REPORT, supra note 33, at 17.
128.

See RYDER REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.

129.

Id. at 7.

130.

See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28, at 12.

131.

See id. at 12, 18-20; SCHLESINGER

132.

See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 43-46, app. B.

REPORT,

supra note 38, at 72-73.
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Defense Secretary Runsfeld. 133 The report also examined some of the
relevant policy memoranda from the White House and the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and discussed the impact of these
memos on the handling of detainees. 134
While the Schlesinger Panel stated unequivocally that there was no
high-level involvement in the Abu Ghraib abuse, 135 significant evidence
in the report raised questions about this finding. There are several
examples of this.
In a paragraph headed, "Pressure on Interrogators to Produce
Actionable Intelligence," the report listed sources of what it refers to as
pressures on interrogators to produce results, stating,
With lives at stake, senior leaders expressed, forcibly at times, their
needs for better intelligence. A number of visits by high-level
officials to Abu Ghraib undoubtedly contributed to this perceived
pressure. Both the CJTF-7 commander and his intelligence officer,
CJTF-7 C-2136 visited the prison on several occasions. MG Miller's
visit in August/September 2003 stressed the need to move from
simply collecting tactical information to collecting information of
operational and strategic value. In November 2003, a senior member
of the National Security Council Staff visited Abu Ghraib leading
some personnel at the facility to conclude, perhaps incorrectly, that
even the White House was137
interested in the intelligence gleaned from
their interrogation reports.
This "forcible expression" by senior leaders in the Army and
"perceived pressure" by the interrogators cries out for investigation.
However, the report provided no additional information on this subject,
and blandly concluded, "Despite the number of visits and the intensity of
interest in actionable intelligence, however, the Panel found no undue
pressure exerted by senior officials. Nevertheless, their eagerness for
' 38
intelligence may have been perceived by interrogators as pressure."'
The report cited no interviews with witnesses nor any documents to
support this remarkable assertion.

133. Among the others interviewed by the Schlesinger Panel were Under Secretary
Douglas Feith, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary Steve Cambone, and
Gen. John Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command. See SCHLESINGER REPORT,
supra note 38, at 22-23.
134. See id. at 6-8, 33-38.
135. Seeid. at43.
136. Combined Joint Task Force-7 Commander LTG Ricardo Sanchez and Combined
Joint Task Force-7 C-2, MG Barbara Fast, Director for Intelligence, respectively.
137. SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 65-66.
138. Id. at 66.
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The report did not criticize, or even adequately investigate, actions
by high-level officials. 139 This contrasted with how the report dealt with
the actions of lower-level leaders, criticizing both the MI and MP
Battalion commanders as "weak and ineffective leaders [who] ...by not

communicating standards, policies and plans to soldiers.., conveyed a
sense of tacit approval of abusive behaviors4 toward prisoners."' 140 It also
endorsed discipline for these commanders.' '
If the "tacit approval" of these weak Battalion commanders was of
sufficient importance to warrant discipline and specific mention as a
factor leading to the abuse, how much more weight should be given to
the approval or direction of interrogation techniques from the highest
levels of the U.S. government? Any pressure from the Defense Secretary

or the White House would be a very important source of direct or tacit
approval. To explain it away as merely "perceived pressure" seems, at
best, inconsistent with other points in the report and, at worst, misleading
and disingenuous.
There is also the reference to a visit by "a senior member of the
National Security Council (NSC) Staff " that led some personnel to
conclude "that even the White House" was following their work
closely. 42 This November 2003 visit occurred at the time of some of the
worst abuses at the prison. Neither this senior NSC staff person nor
anyone from the NSC was interviewed by Schlesinger or other DoD
investigators. No one from the White House was interviewed about
this. 143

There is also something revealing in this sentence about the NSC
staff person. Given the subject matter, we can assume that the report's
authors chose their language with care. The authors did not state that the
personnel were wrong about the White House interest in their
interrogations. Instead, they stated that some personnel concluded
"perhapsincorrectly, that even the White House was interested" in their
interrogation reports.144 The use here of the equivocation "perhaps"
raises the distinct possibility that the White House was playing a role in
the interrogation process. At a minimum, the equivocation pointed
strongly to the need for further investigation on the question of White
House involvement. No such investigation happened.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
reports.
144.

Id.
Id. at 75.
See id. at 15.
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 66.
In fact, this is one of the few places the words "White House" appear in the DoD
See id.
See id. (emphasis added).
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These unanswered questions and dangling leads contrast with the
Schlesinger Report's otherwise comprehensive approach and tone. The
Panel had the widest possible scope of investigation. It conducted
interviews at the highest levels of the Defense Department, and the
resulting report is generally more candid and critical than the other DoD
reports. And yet, the investigation did not follow up on obvious leads it
produced in this most critical area.
A close reading of the Fay/Jones Report revealed similar unpursued
leads and raised similar questions. One such lead was buried midparagraph in an unrelated discussion of the interrogation teams'
organization: "JIDC 145 personnel at Abu Ghraib believed the thirst for
intelligence reporting to feed the national level systems was driving the
train. There was then a focus to fill that perceived void and feed that
system."' 146 This belief by MI interrogators that "national level systems
[were] driving the train" at the prison was squarely within the scope of
the Fay/Jones investigation. It raises a number of obvious questions:
Why did this personnel believe this? What was the basis for this belief?
Who communicated this to them? What were they told? Pressures from
"national level systems" clearly raised the possibility that high-level
officials were responsible for the abuses at the prison, but the Fay/Jones
Report did not address this possibility.
The report addresses this issue of high-level pressure in a confusing,
illogical manner with evidence of questionable relevance:
"LTG
Sanchez did not believe significant pressure was coming from outside of
CJTF-7, but does confirm that there was great pressure placed upon the
intelligence system to produce actionable intelligence.' 47 Lieutenant
General Sanchez was as an off-site manager numerous levels of
command above the actual interrogators. His "belief' that there was no
significant outside pressure on the interrogators cannot carry the same
evidentiary weight as the statements of on-the-ground Army intelligence
professionals at the prison. In fact, as noted below, the Fay/Jones Report
revealed that these interrogators were, in fact, receiving direction from
48
outside the chain of command, possibly bypassing Sanchez himself.
There is also a troubling contradictory quality to Sanchez's statement.
He reported there were no significant outside pressures, but at the same
149
time confirmed "great pressure placed upon the intelligence system."'

145. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) coordinated interrogations
in the Hard Site of the prison where most of the abuses occurred.
146. FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at 42 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 42.
148. See id. at 45.
149. See id. at 42.
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The Fay/Jones Report contained more about pressures from outside
the prison, stating, "COL Pappas 50 perceived intense pressure for
intelligence from interrogations.
This began soon after he took
Command in July 2003.... That pressure for better results was passed
from COL Pappas to the rest of the JIDC leadership... and from them to
the interrogators and analysts operating at Abu Ghraib."'' l The report
stated that the pressure included
deviation from doctrinal reporting standards (pressure to report
rapidly any and all information in non-standard formats such as
Interrogator Notes in lieu of standard intelligence reports), directed
guidance and prioritization from "higher," outside of doctrinal or
standard operating procedures, to pursue specific lines of questioning
with specific detainees, and high priority "VFR Direct"' 152 taskings to
the lowest levels in the JIDC. 15
The report was quite specific about the forms the pressure took, but the
ambiguous description of the source of the pressure ("from 'higher"')
signaled a reluctance by the authors to address this issue directly. The
detailed listing of the forms of pressure presumably came from witnesses
who reported they received specific directions from specific individuals
and organizations. However, the report did not provide information
about the sources of the pressure, how it was transmitted, and whether
there were discussions of interrogation approaches. Who were the
individuals or organizations providing the "VFR Direct taskings?" Who
was present at the meetings where this was discussed? What was said?
What documents exist recording this?
The Fay/Jones Report provided additional evidence of higher-level
involvement in the Abu Ghraib interrogations:
During our interviews, leaders within the MI community commented
upon the intense pressure they felt from higher headquarters, to
include CENTCOM, 154 the Pentagon, and DIA [Defense Intelligence
Agency] for timelier, actionable intelligence. These leaders have
stated that this pressure adversely affected their decision making....
Based on the statements from interrogators and analysts,
the pressure
155
was allowed to be passed down to the lowest levels.

150. Colonel Thomas M. Pappas was the Brigade Commander in the 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade at Abu Ghraib.
151. FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at 45.
152. "VFR direct" is military lingo for jumping several levels in the bureaucratic
chain, as in "he went VFR direct to the Chief of Staff." VFR stands for Visual Flight
Rules, a practice that calls for use of actual landmarks to take the most direct route.
153. FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at 45.
154. CENTCOM stands for U.S. Central Command.
155.

FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at 112.
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In an extraordinary example of avoiding the obvious, the Fay/Jones
Report did not pursue this lead, which pointed to the involvement of high
level officials in the abuse. Instead, it leapfrogged over this problematic
evidence, ignoring it except to conclude that MI "leaders failed to take
steps to effectively manage pressure placed upon JIDC personnel.' 56 In
the Fay/Jones analysis, the problem became the failure of lower-level
managers to interpose themselves between these unnamed high-level
individuals and the interrogators, rather than the instructions and orders
issued by these high-level individuals.
G. Analytical Errors
The DoD reports contained analytical errors including unsupported
conclusions, mischaracterizations of the evidence, exaggerations,
inconsistent logic, and the use of minimizing or misleading language.
The Schlesinger Report catalogued a list of high-level visits and
interventions at Abu Ghraib, and Fay/Jones documented that the
commander of MI at the prison perceived "intense pressure" from highlevel officials; however, both reports concluded that no one above the
Brigade level bore responsibility for the abuses. 157 No substantive
evidence or analysis was provided to address these apparent
contradictions. These unsupported conclusions about the high-level
officials also contrasted with how the reports dealt with allegations
against lower-level leaders.
Several of the investigations were undercut by an obvious hole in
their analyses relating to the actions of Other Government Agencies
(OGAs) at the prison. It is clear from the Fay/Jones Report that OGAs
played a significant role at the prison. The report detailed how LTC
Jordan "became fascinated" with the OGAs, and allowed them to
conduct interrogations without Army personnel present. 5 8 It included
accounts of "ghost detainees" associated with the OGAs,159 the death of a
detainee in OGA custody at the prison, and the bringing of a weapon into
an interrogation room by an OGA officer. 160 There were reports of
unsupervised OGA involvement in the handling of detainees at a number

156. See id.
157. See SCHLESINGER
33, at 112.

REPORT,

supra note 38, at 43; FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note

See FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at 44.
159. Ghost detainees were detainees brought into the prison by OGAs and who were
not recorded in any official records as having been at the facility.
160. See FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at 52-55,118-19.
158.

2009]

DIAGNOSING AND ANALYZING FLAWED INVESTIGATIONS

31

of points. 61 The report even acknowledged that "OGA
interrogation
1 62
practices led to a loss of accountability" at the prison.
None of the DoD investigators received access to anyone associated
with the OGAs.' 63 They conducted no interviews with OGA personnel,
nor reviewed any documents related to OGAs. 64 In spite of this obvious
gap in its review of Abu Ghraib operations, Fay/Jones still concluded
that "no organization or individual higher in the chain of command...
were directly involved in the questionable activities." 65 There is no
caveat or asterisk associated with this finding. Without investigating
OGA involvement at the prison, this sweeping conclusion was simply
not credible.
Fay/Jones's approach contrasted with how the Schlesinger Report
dealt with the same problem in its analysis. While Schlesinger made
similar sweeping conclusions, it specifically delineated the missing
evidence, and called for further investigation. It stated they "did not
have full access to information involving the role of the Central
Intelligence Agency in detention operations; this is an area the Panel
believes needs further investigation and review."1 66 At another point it
stated that "[t]he Panel did not have sufficient
access to CIA information
' 67
to make any determination in this regard."'
The Mikolashek Report mischaracterized the evidence at several
points. In one illustration of this, Mikolashek cited four incidents of
abuse as examples of situations in which "the abuse was discovered
immediately by the command, and corrective actions were taken to
prevent a recurrence.'' 68
However, one of the four examples
demonstrated just the opposite.
Describing an incident when an
interrogator struck a detainee on the head during questioning, the report
stated that "[t]he International Committee of the Red Cross, via the
mayor of the detainee's compound, discovered this after the fact. Once
he was made aware of the incident, the soldier's commander investigated
and ultimately issued a field-grade article 15. '' 169 This is hardly an
example of the abuse being "discovered immediately."
The Mikolashek Report's first finding stated, "All interviewed and
observed commanders, leaders, and soldiers treated detainees humanely

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

166.
167.
168.
169.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 118-19.
See id.
See FAY/JONES REPORT, supra note 33, at 2.
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 6.
Id. at 70.
MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30 (emphasis added).
Id. at 19.
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170
and emphasized the importance of the humane treatment of detainees."'
Two lines later, the report contradicts this, stating, investigators
"conducted numerous interviews and sensing sessions with leaders and
soldiers that revealed most leaders and soldiers have treated detainees
humanely.' 171 The contrast between the two statements is immediately
evident: While the finding asserts that all interviewed soldiers treated
detainees humanely, at least some soldiers apparently reported that
detainees had not been treated humanely.
Mikolashek repeatedly compared what he described as the "94 cases
of confirmed or possible abuse of any type," to the estimated 50,000
detainees who were held by U.S. forces. 172 He used this comparison to
conclude that the abuses were merely an unauthorized aberration.
However, his estimate of ninety-four cases was based solely on Army
CID and unit summaries of investigations as of June 9, 2004.17' He did
not consult reports by the International Committee of the Red Cross. He
did not consult any Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). He did
not include any estimates for incidents involving detainees held by
OGAs. In a striking contrast, nineteen months after Mikolashek's
estimate of only ninety-four incidents, the Army's Deputy Inspector
General for Intelligence reported that DoD components had 842 criminal
investigations or inquiries of detainee and prisoner abuse. 1 74 A report by
Human Rights First documented over 330 cases "in which U.S. military
and civilian personnel were credibly alleged to have abused or killed
detainees" as of April 10, 2006.17
Mikolashek used other minimizing or misleading language. In a
discussion of the detention facilities, the report stated, "Of all facilities
inspected, only Abu Ghraib was determined to be undesirable for
housing detainees because it is located near an urban population and is
under frequent hostile fire,"' 176 leaving a positive impression of the
overall state of U.S. detention facilities. The use of "only" in this context
is misleading because, as the Schlesinger Report pointed out, Abu Ghraib
was the "primary operational level detention facility" 177 and was the
largest in Iraq or Afghanistan by a considerable factor. In addition,
Mikolashek ignored that the placing of a detention facility under hostile

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at iv.
See id.
See YOUNG REPORT, supra note 6, at I.
SHAMsi, supra note 101.
MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30, at 22.
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 59.
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fire is a direct violation of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and
AR 190-8.178
H.

Transparencyof the Investigative Process

Investigative reports need to provide a certain level of transparency
and professionalism in order to be found credible. This transparency
takes many forms, some of which can be found in the DoD
investigations. Steps to insure transparency included providing the
initiating documents for an investigation, identifying the investigators,
and listing which witnesses were interviewed and what documents were
reviewed.179 Unfortunately, most of the DoD investigations lacked other
elements that are generally considered vital in an unbiased professional
report.
1.

Providing Sources and Footnoting

Transparency enables the reader to evaluate the quality of the
findings by examining the underlying sources for those conclusions. By
providing the sources for findings through footnotes or other means,
180
investigative reports build in some inherent accountability.
The Taguba Report provided sourcing information for most of its
assertions on an almost a paragraph-by-paragraph basis. 18 By contrast,
Mikolashek had pages and pages of findings with little or no sourcing
information to support them.18 2 The Schlesinger Report also provided
little or no sourcing for its findings, which is a particularly frustrating
omission given the report's sweeping conclusions and the high-level
nature of its investigation.183 Schlesinger interviewed personnel at the
highest level of the Defense Department, and it would be helpful to know
which of the report's conclusions were based on which of the high-level
interviews.184 The Fay/Jones Report was inconsistent in providing
footnotes and sourcing, providing sourcing in some sections of the
185
report, but not in others.

178. See FAY/JONEs REPORT, supra note 33, at 111.
179. In a laudable step, the Mikolashek Report provided the actual question lists used
to interview witnesses.
180. See Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 3. Have footnotes for "every statement or fact

in the body of the report." Id.
181.

See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28.

182.

See MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30.

183.
184.
185.

See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38.
See id.
See FAY/JONEs REPORT, supra note 33.
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Acknowledging Gaps in the Evidence

No investigation can get to all the facts. There can be many reasons
for this, ranging from the innocent to the more suspicious. Whatever the
reason, the unavailability of important evidence becomes a fact that must
be reported and evaluated.
The Taguba Report did this well.
The scope of Taguba's
investigation was limited to the MPs, but in the course of that inquiry, he
developed views on the culpability of MI personnel in the abuses.
Taguba reported this, stating, "there is sufficient credible information to
warrant an inquiry.., be conducted to determine the extent of
culpability of MI personnel."' 86 He specifically identified two officers
and two
military contractors whom he suspected of involvement in the
87
abuse.
Other DoD reports failed to identifiy important areas of evidence
that were missing from their reports, or failed to highlight the missing
evidence's potential significance. Most contain little or no evidence
collected from the White House or other Executive Branch offices, but
this absence received no mention, comment, or analysis.
None of the investigations included evidence from OGAs. Some,
like the Schlesinger Report, clearly identified this as a gap in the data and
recommended further investigation, but even Schlesinger did not cite this
gap as a caveat to its very broad findings.188 The Fay/Jones Report made
similar sweeping conclusions while ignoring the absence of any data on
the role of OGAs in the abuse.
3.

Style and Tone

In a professional investigation, the overall text has a neutral and
unbiased tone. The report may find misconduct or violations of policy,
but until that point the reader should not find hints of the author's own
views.
The Taguba Report handled this matter correctly. While the report
provided context and background for the abuse, the findings of
misconduct were presented in a clear and direct manner. While Taguba
praised the service of most of the personnel at the prison, he did this
separately from his findings and did not suggest that their service
mitigated the abuse. 89 The Schlesinger Report, irrespective of its other

186.

TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28, at 48.

187.
188.

See id.
See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 38, at 13.
See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 28, at 47.

189.
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flaws, also had a tone and presentation that were consistent with the
independent investigation it purported to be.
The Mikolashek Report took a different approach. From the very
first paragraphs of the report, it took pains to review all the dangers and
hazards of service for the military personnel at the prison: "We found
that soldiers are conducting operations under demanding, stressful and
dangerous conditions against an enemy who does not follow the Geneva
Convention. They are in an environment that puts a tremendous demand
on human intelligence."' 90 Later, the report stated, "Soldiers are placed
in extremely dangerous positions on a daily basis. They face the daily
risks of being attacked by detainees, being taunted or spat upon, having
urine or feces thrown upon them, and having to treat a detainee
humanely who has just attacked their unit or fellow soldier."' 19'
Without minimizing the tremendous challenges U.S. troops faced,
these obstacles have regrettably become relatively standard fare during
the Iraq war and other conflicts in the modem era. Similarly, the dangers
described in Mikolashek of working in an Iraqi detention facility are not
dissimilar from those a non-military correctional officer would
experience working in some high-security prisons in the U.S.
In any event, these difficult conditions cannot trump or even
significantly mitigate the overall responsibility to treat detainees
humanely. Discussing these issues at the very outset of the investigative
report, as Mikolashek did, exaggerated their significance. The Fay/Jones
Report was similar to the Mikolashek Report in the care it took to first
describe the challenges confronting the troops before documenting the
abuse.
Mikolashek combined the listing of challenges with almost fulsome
praise for those serving in these conditions:
We found through our interviews and observations... that leaders
and soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq were determined to do what was
legally and morally right for their fellow soldiers and the detainees
under their care.
We found numerous examples of military
professionalism, ingrained Army Values, and moral courage in both
leaders and soldiers. These leaders and soldiers were self-disciplined
and demonstrated an ability
to maintain composure during times of
192
great stress and danger.
While this author does not doubt the accuracy of many of these
statements, the inclusion of this type of cheerleading for the United
States Army is inconsistent with the tone expected in a unbiased report.
190.
191.

MIKOLASHEK REPORT, supra note 30, at ii.
Id. at 16.

192.

Id. at ii.
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Reading text like this, it is unsurprising to learn that Mikolashek
determined that there were "no193systemic failures" in the Army's handling
of the detainee abuse scandal.
IV. PROTOCOLS FOR FUTURE INVESTIGATIONS

The question of ultimate command responsibility for the abuses at
Abu Ghraib may never be fully addressed. The reason for this is clear:
the DoD investigations had flaws at every step. From the choice of the
investigators at the outset, to the selection of witnesses and the reliance
on prior flawed reports, continuing through the failure to pursue
important leads, and the inclusion of analytical errors, we see mistakes
that influenced the findings in fundamental ways. In the end, despite an
enormous expenditure of time, money, and manpower, many outside
observers challenged the reports' conclusions that the abuse was an
aberration caused by a small group of graveyard shift guards.
In a close examination of the reports, we can find a guide to the
types of mistakes to avoid in future investigations, as well as a guide to
what an effective investigation should look like. What follows is a
proposed protocol for effective independent investigations of public
controversies, building from the problems with the DoD Abu Ghraib
investigations.
A.

Selection of Investigators
1.

Independence

The lead investigators must be functionally independent of the
organization that they are investigating.194 They cannot rely upon that
organization for their professional advancement or survival.
The
possibility of uncovering potentially damaging information about one's
superiors has both a conscious and unconscious impact on the types of
information investigators gather and the conclusions they reach. Only an
extremely rare individual can overcome this chilling effect.
But independence is not just an issue of a person's position in a
chain of command; it is also an attitude or a perspective. Investigators
must be free of direct institutional loyalties, and emotionally and
intellectually independent of the organization.' 95 The Schlesinger Panel

193. See id. at iv.
194. See Ferrara et al., supra note 59, at 5; Brodsky, supra note 9, at 1; Brantley &
Anderson, supra note 9, at 2.
195. See Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 1.
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was functionally independent of the chain of command, but tightly bound
to DoD by history and experience.
2.

Balance of Perspectives

Independence is not the only goal in choosing an investigator; the
investigative team should draw on a balance of perspectives from outside
and inside the organization. 196 There are many good reasons to have
members of the subject organization on an investigative team. In an
organization like the Army, soldiers and officers not only work together,
but live together on a twenty-four-hour basis. Not surprisingly, there is a
strong internal Army culture that is suspicious of those who are not part
of that culture. An investigation staffed solely by human rights activists,
for instance, would have difficulty conducting interviews with soldiers
and officers used to military procedures and processes.
At the same time, there are many reasons to include investigators
from outside the organization. An investigation staffed solely by active
duty military officers would discourage some witnesses from coming
forward with information critical of the Army. The goal is a balanced
1 97
team of investigators from different backgrounds and perspectives.
3.

Use of Outside Subject Matter Experts

Effective investigations need to utilize outside subject matter
experts, either as investigators on the team or as consultants. 198 One of
the goals of an investigation of a public controversy is to report to those
outside the organization in the news media or oversight bodies like
Congress. Consequently, the organization will not only be judged by its
internal standards, but by those in the larger community. Outside subject

196. Among the reasons that a balance of professional perspectives is necessary is
that each profession brings its own investigative approach. In a book regarding another
public controversy, the Challenger disaster, the author quotes from a study of mental
health professionals evaluating the potential dangerousness of mental health patients. See
DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE

AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 412 (1997). The patients were examined by a team consisting
of a social worker, a psychiatrist and a psychologist. See id. The researchers found that
each of these three professional types "had distinctive worldviews ... that channeled
themselves into specific diagnostic interactions: [with] selective structures for question
asking and answer hearing." Id. This, in turn, significantly impacted the type of data
they obtained from the same patient. See id.
197. Writing about assembling criminal investigative teams which are more likely to
prevent criminal investigative failures, one author's recommendation is to "[h]ire and
respect... a diversity of experience, perspectives and ways of thinking about and
approaching problems. A team reflecting professional diversity is more productive and
less likely to fail." See RoSsMo, supra note 10, at 133-34.
198. See Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 2; Brantley & Anderson, supra note 9 at 2.
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matter experts can provide insight into wider professional and
community standards of conduct. 99Their clear independence provides
credibility to the resulting findings.1
An effective investigative team should have functional and
emotional independence from the subject organization, and include both
internal staff familiar with the organization and culture, along with
outside subject matter experts who can provide perspective and expertise
from the wider community.
B.

Scope of Investigation

In a public scandal, the more serious the underlying allegations are,
the broader the scope of the investigation should be. The questions of
"what did management know and when did they know it" become of
increasingly greater concern. Investigators
need to be free to follow
200
leads wherever they reasonably go.
Decision makers should be cautious about limiting the scope of any
investigation on the front end because they cannot predict where the
evidence will lead. Former U.S. Attorney General Dick Thomburgh
acted as a court-appointed examiner in the WorldCom bankruptcy
proceeding, and led the investigation of the CBS 60 Minutes Wednesday
segment on President Bush's Texas Air National Guard service. He
noted that both investigations began with a more narrow focus, but
widened into much broader inquiries. He wrote, "Recognize that you
may not be sure
of the direction at the outset, nor the extent of the work
20 1
involved.,
C.

Selection of Witnesses
1.

Balance of Witnesses

Events and scandals like the Abu Ghraib case involve highly
charged controversies or disputes over what actually happened. Facts are
inevitably in dispute.
Sometimes, investigators reject interviewing one group of witnesses
based upon assumptions about what they will say. They take the view
that this group of witnesses are biased, or could not have made useful
observations given their perspective. These kinds of assumptions can be
seductive for an investigator, but also potentially misleading. Without
199. See Brodsky, supra note 9, at 4.
200. See ROssMo, supra note 10, at 134. "Keep the focus on the goal of developing
the corrective narrative, not... confirming any one narrative." Id.
201. Thomburgh, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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interviewing witnesses from all sides, it is impossible to know what they
will say or what perspective they will provide.
Just as local police in the United States would not conduct a
criminal investigation without interviewing the crime victim or the
victim's survivors, a full investigation requires contacting those impacted
by the alleged misconduct. After an interview is completed, a decision
can then be made regarding how much weight or credibility to give to
that witness. However, not to interview an entire group of percipient
witnesses is poor investigative practice. An effective investigation
should interview witnesses from all sides of a dispute.
2.

Choosing Witnesses Consistent with the Investigation's Scope

The scope of an investigation provides a clear guide to who must be
interviewed. The witness list must include individuals who can address
the scope at the highest level nece-sary.
Investigators often come from somewhere well below the top of the
organizational chart, and there is a natural reluctance to confront higherlevel managers. Often, investigators look for witnesses from the lowest
possible levels inside an organization.
The rule of thumb should be the opposite. The question of
leadership's role is always in play in public scandals, and any report that
fails to address this will lack a critical element. The results of the higher
level interviews must be part of the report findings and cited as such. At
a minimum, any failure to interview a critical witness should be
documented.
In a situation where something controversial has occurred, the
investigator should continue up the chain of command to interview all
those who would reasonably have information regarding the controversy.
D. Barriersto Disclosure
Barriers to disclosures for witnesses exist 2in
all investigations, and
02
any effective investigation must deal with them.
1.

Identifying and Addressing Barriers to Disclosure

Identification of the barriers to disclosure is especially important in
a military or paramilitary organization where witnesses can be
disciplined for any bad actions they participated in, as well as for failing
to report the bad acts of others. These regulations about failing to report

202. See BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 111, at 221-43; ZWER & BOCCHINO, supra
note 111, at 16-35.
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misconduct may be well-meaning, but once an investigation begins, they
can have a chilling effect that discourages witnesses from speaking
candidly about what they observed.
Effective investigators must have a plan to deal with each case's
unique challenges. 0 3 For instance, in a case involving female rape
victims, it may be useful to utilize female investigators for some
interviews. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
used paired teams of investigators from the pre-apartheid police forces
and liberation movements to encourage disclosures by witnesses from
both sides of the apartheid-era conflict.20 4 Investigations, such as those
at Abu Ghraib, where witnesses may have potential criminal or
disciplinary exposure for their statements could utilize offers of
immunity, anonymous "tip" lines, or craft some forms of confidentiality
or anonymity into their dealings with witnesses.
At a minimum, investigators should take steps to avoid exacerbating
the barriers to disclosure.20 5 Interviews should be conducted at times and
locations where witnesses can attend without others in their organization
being aware of it.
Investigators should provide assurances that
information will be kept confidential, if and when that is possible.
Witnesses should be provided information about anti-retaliation policies,
if the organization has these, as well as contact numbers for the witnesses
to call if they perceive retaliation.
Investigators must identify the barriers to witnesses' disclosure of
critical evidence in their case, and plans must be implemented to address
and mitigate these barriers.20 6
2.

Acknowledging Disclosure Barriers in the Report's Analysis

Even the best efforts to address these barriers will fall short of their
goals. Inevitably, some witnesses will not provide full disclosure, or will
lie about their knowledge of important events. The investigative report
must acknowledge this as it reviews and analyzes the evidence
collected.2 °7 It should identify the potential barriers in the text of the
report. As the report analyzes witness testimony, these issues may affect

203. See BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 111, at 222. "It is important to
acknowledge that nearly everyone you interview has his or her own agenda or set of
objectives." See Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 3.
204. See Keith Rohman, Investigating the Past: An Examination of the Investigative
Unit, in NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION: EXPOSING OFFENSES OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID PAST 7, 8-9 (2004).

205. See Ames Davis & Jennifer L. Weaver, A Litigator's Approach to Interviewing
Witnesses in InternalInvestigations, 17 HEALTH LAW. 8, at 3-4 (2005).
206. See Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 3.
207. See id. at 3.
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the credibility given to a particular witness, or the weight given to an
aspect of his or her testimony.
E.

Appropriate Use of PriorInvestigations

Prior investigations can be useful, and an effective investigator will
not ignore them. The earlier investigations may allow the investigator to
check for inconsistent statements by a witness, to find an overview of the
facts, or guide the investigator to other documentary or witness evidence.
However, the prior reports need to be evaluated carefully, looking at
factors such as the methodologies used, the level of access to
information, and the perspective of the report's authors. 20 8
The
investigator should treat the prior investigations as they would any other
piece of evidence: examining it critically before citing it as reliable
evidence.
F.

IntellectualIntegrity in the Analysis ofEvidence

An investigation is not a mere collection of facts, and the
investigator is not a mere transcriber. Investigation calls for both the
collection and analysis of relevant evidence. This analysis should occur
while the inquiry is underway, and in reaching factual conclusions. It
must be undertaken with intellectual honesty and integrity, and with the
goal of determining the full implications of all the evidence collected.2 °9
There are several components to this process.
1.

Consistency in Analysis

Investigators should apply the same analytical standards and
requirements to all the facts they encounter. If an investigator requires
external corroboration before believing the statements of one category of
witnesses, such as detainees, they should apply similar standards to other
types of witnesses, such as soldiers. If the report has extensive evidence
and analysis about one set of critical facts, such as the actions of lower

208. There is writing in the field of historical scholarship on related points. See
Evans, supra note 11, at 94-95. "We use the same procedures in reading. secondary
sources as we do in reading primary: We ask who has written the document, and why,
and to whom the document is addressed and why; we check it out for internal consistency
and for consistency with other documents relating to the same subject; and if it contains
information derived from other sources, we ask where this information came from and do
our best to check it out, too." Id.
209. See Thornburgh, supra note 9, at 3. "Be fair. Remember that you are neither
prosecutors nor defense counsel.... Be thorough. Issues will inevitably come to your
attention from virtually every imaginable source and they all must be carefully
evaluated." Id.
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level managers, it should provide a similar level of analysis to other
critical facts, like the actions of high-level managers.
2.

Critical Examination of All the Evidence

The analysis must be comprehensive; it must include all relevant
evidence and not cherry-pick those facts that appear consistent with
certain desired findings. 2'0 Even inconvenient facts must be identified
211
and addressed analytically.
There can be no unquestioned or unsupported acceptance of any
important facts.2t 2 No one witness or group of witnesses can be assumed
to be truthful at all times, or, alternatively, to lack credibility at all times,
unless there is a clearly stated analysis as to why. Some views that are
strongly held inside an organization may not be shared by others outside
the group. These views need to be supported by specific evidence.21 3
There will be times when important gaps in the evidence cannot be
filled by the investigation. An investigation with intellectual integrity
214
will identify these gaps, and call for further investigation in the future.
It will not leap over the gap in order to reach sweeping definitive
conclusions.21 5
An effective investigation will include a critical examination of all
the evidence collected. All important assertions of facts must be
supported by evidence that is clearly identified for the reader.

210. See id.
211. In criminal investigations, the failure to address inconvenient facts can be seen in
confirmation biases. "Confirmation bias is a type of selective thinking in which an
individual is more likely to notice or search for evidence that confirms his or her
theory.... [including] failure to seek evidence (e.g., a suspect's alibi) that would
disprove the theory, not utilizing such evidence if found, refusing to consider alternative
hypothesis, and failure to evaluate evidence diagnostically." ROssMO, supra note 10, at
17.
212. See Thornburgh, supra note 11 at 3. "Consider having a separate footnoted
version of any final written report which provides support from the investigative record
for every statement or fact in the body of the report." Id.
213. For example, the Mikolashek Report justified its findings by stating that soldiers
were engaged in a conflict "against an enemy who does not follow the Geneva
Convention"; a view that is not without controversy in some circles. See MIKOLASHEK
REPORT, supra note 30, at i.
214. See ROssMO, supra note 10, at 18. "Investigators often fail to account for the
absence of evidence, something that can be quite important in certain circumstances." Id.
215. Good examples of this can be found in the Taguba and Schlesinger Reports. The
Taguba Report did this in regards to the role of MI at the prison, as did the Schlesinger
Report in connection with the role of the CIA in the handling of detainees.
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Following Leads to Logical End Points

For an investigation to have credibility, it must follow all leads to
their logical conclusions, fleshing out and examining all the reasonable
implications of the evidence. Obviously, the scope of the inquiry must
be broad enough to permit this, but once that is delineated, the
investigator's responsibility is clear. Evidentiary leads must be pursued
as high up the relevant management chain as possible. If such an inquiry
is prevented from going further, this limitation must be clearly
identified
2 16
provided.
limitation
the
for
reasons
the
and
reader
the
for
The investigation must continue until the investigator reaches the
level where responsibility clearly lies, or they are prevented from going
further.
4.

Transparent Process

The report should be written in as transparent and professional a
manner as possible. Assertions and conclusions should have sources or
footnotes connected with them.2t 7 Gaps in available data must be
identified and addressed. The style and tone of the report should be
neutral in its presentation.
V.

THE ROLE OF INVESTIGATIONS IN PUBLIC SCANDALS

For an organization confronted by a scandal like Abu Ghraib,
investigation is a powerful tool. It enables the organization to appear
serious about the controversy without having to make any immediate
changes. It provides a short-term, but relatively painless response to the
media, the public, or government regulators. It buys time to gauge the
seriousness of the problem, as well as the outside reaction to the scandal.
And if the conclusions are favorable, it provides the basis for the
organization to move on.
But an investigation is also a potentially dangerous thing for an
organization.
If conducted in a truly independent manner, the
organization may be opening its doors to individuals who do not share its
corporate culture or values, and who can be hard to control. Even when
the investigation is conducted by a less independent-minded investigator,
the results may be hard to control. Damaging facts can be like
toothpaste, hard to get back in the tube once out. Documents may come

216. There are certainly potential legitimate reasons for information or witnesses
being unavailable.
These can include national security concerns, a witness's
unavailability due to illness or even death, or a lack of time or resources to contact them.
217. See Thornburgh, supra note 10, at 124.
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to light that lead to problematic questions. A witness may make a
problematic statement that is then captured in a report or a transcript.
Confronted with these challenges, organizations seek to carefully
structure internal investigations.
The top-down coverup of the
Watergate-era is not an option in today's 24-hour news environment;
there are just too many people watching too closely.
Instead,
organizations attempt to structure investigations in a manner that can
withstand public scrutiny and address public concerns, but also to limit
and control the investigation to prevent further damage to the
organization.
The DoD investigations were classic examples of this. The
tremendous resources devoted to the investigations lent a veneer of
seriousness and credibility to the effort. The use of high-ranking
generals and former Defense Secretaries gave the reports an air of
respectability. The large number of reports gave the impression that a
wide-ranging and comprehensive inquiry had been conducted.
Yet, the reality was very different. There were a series of controls
and limitations designed into the structure of the investigations that
impacted their findings. In some cases, these took the form of a limited
scope of inquiry, as in the Taguba Report. In other cases, the controls
included the selection of investigators from the military or retired DoD
leaders, or the deliberate selection of witnesses who were most likely to
provide limited evidence. Looking at all these controls and limitations
together, the limited findings of the DoD reports appear pre-ordained.
The truth can be elusive, but it matters. The issues raised by the
Abu Ghraib scandal and similar governmental controversies are too
important to be left to the vagaries of internal organization interests and
loyalties. A process must be followed that gets to the truth, no matter
where it leads. The goal is not a perfect investigation, but one that seeks,
at all critical points, to hold itself to as high a standard as possible, and
when it falls short, to identify those shortcomings in a transparent
manner. A close study of the failures of the DoD investigations can
show us a pathway to more effective investigations that can get to the
truth of the matter.

